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The Changing Concept of
Animals as Property
Vincent P. McCarthy
Introduction
In a suit brought by a slaveowner
against his neighbor in 1827 for the killing of his slave, the court found that the
bad character of the slave (caught while
stealing potatoes from the defendant's
property) should be taken into account
by the jury in assessing damages for the
wrongful destruction of the slaveowner's
property (1). However, the court warned:

But where property is in question,
the value of the article, as nearly as
it can be ascertained, furnishes a
rule from which they [the jury] are
not at Iiberty to depart (2).
Almost 100 years later, another litigant brought suit in Connecticut to recover compensation for the wrongful destruction (3) of his personal property, which
was shot while similarly trespassing on a
neighbor's property. This time the plaintiff's personal property was his dog. In
reaching its conclusion that the plaintiff
was entitled to recover for the loss of his
dog, the court reaffirmed the well-established common law property status of
animals:

It [the statute] attaches to the right
of property, including a recovery of
damages under circumstances where
such a recovery would be allowed for
other kinds of personal property (4).
That slaves were viewed as nothing
more than the personal property of their
owners had never been seriously questioned. One of the earliest treatises on British law makes note of this status, and it
adds an interesting comment on animal
rights. In distinguishing serfs, who did
have recognized legal rights, from slaves,
Maitland notes:

In relation to his lord the general
rule makes him rightless ... the state
is concerned to see (only] that no one
shall make an ill use of his property.
Our modern statutes which prohibit
cruelty do not give rights to dogs
and horses ... (5).
The most well-known legal statement on the personal property status of
American black slaves makes it clear that
this view was never seriously questioned.

They had for more than a century
before been regarded as beings of
an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race,
either in social or political relations;
and so far inferior, that they had
no rights which the white man was
bound to respect· and that the negro
might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. .. This
opinion was at that time fixed and
universal in the civilized portion of
the white race. It was regarded as an
axiom in morals as well as in politics,
which no one thought of disputing,
or supposed to be open to dispute;
and men in every grade and position
in society daily and habitually acted
upon it in their private pursuits, as
well as in matters of public concern,
without doubting for a moment the
correctness of this opinion (6).
Enforced and maintained by a legal
superstructure that regulated every aspect of a black's social, political, economic, and religious life, his property status continued until the middle of the
nineteenth century when Congress passed
the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments to
the Constitution, which overturned the
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Ored Scott decision and recognized that
a black human being had legally protectible rights.
There are some signs in recent legal
decisions that a similar evolution in the
status of animals is taking place: judges
are beginning to draw distinctions between animals and property.
But can we ever expect that the
courts will grant full liberation to animals from their status as property?
Blacks, although universally considered
inferior to whites, were always considered to be members of the same species as
whites. Does this taxonomic distinction
between animals and man doom efforts
to enhance their legal status? Although
most states still view animals as the personal property of their owners (7). recent
cases have begun to question this doctrine by rejecting its jurisprudential
basis in the context of mounting scientific, sociological, and philosophical
evidence to the contrary. More important, these decisions have in common a
profound sense of disbelief in the present status of animals as property, based
on an experience of animals that does
not fit with their status as objects no
more valuable than furniture or a television. It is at this most basic level of law
as a formalized reflection of experience
that the legal rights of animals have begun to grow and take shape.

Sentimental Value
In 1975, a suit (Stettner vs. Craubard)
was brought in a New York lower court
to recover the $220 cost of veterinary services required for injuries to a dog (8). In
opposition to this claim, the defendant
argued:
1. That damages cannot exceed the
market value of dog regardless of how
high the veterinary bills run; and
2. That a dog's market value is its
purchase price minus depreciation.
296

In short, the measure of damages for the
death or injury to a dog was asserted to
be the same as might be applied in the
case of an automobile or any other item
of personal property (9).
After noting that the purchase price
is only one factor to be considered in ascertaining the market value of a dog, the
court listed "other relevant factors" including the dog's age, health, usefulness,
and any special traits or characteristics
of value. But the court also held that

Sentiment, however, may not be considered since that often is as much a
measure of the owner's heart as it is
of the dog's worth (1 0).
Although the actual purchase price
of the dog had been $125 to $150, the
court found that the dog had a market
value of $200. The rejection of sentimental value as a measure of recovery is
consistent with the majority view, although many courts have sharply limited
their definition of sentimental value in
other personal property cases (11 ). The
problem in the issue of sentiment is really an evidentiary one (12); sentimental
value can be approached more practically
when considered under the rubric of theories such as companionship, loss of use,
or mental anguish.
Much of what was lost in Stettner
has been regained in two more recent
New York lower-court decisions. On July
10, 1980 the New York Law journal published a small-claims opinion that expanded the measure of recovery for the
death of an animal to include a pecuniary award for loss of companionship (13).
The plaintiff, Mrs. Brousseau, delivered
her healthy 8-year-old dog for boarding
at Dr. Rosenthal's kennel. When she returned to the kennel she learned that her
dog had died. In her suit, which charged
negligence, the court awarded her $550,
plus costs for her loss.
Despite the fact that the compensable loss was suff~red by the owner and
/NT
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not by the dog, Brousseau significantly
enhances the basic concept of an animal's
value. As another New York lower court
stated recently:

This court now overrules prior precedent and holds that a pet is not
just a thing but occupies a special
place somewhere in between a person
and a piece of personal property.
In ruling that a pet such as a dog is
not just a thing I believe the plaintiff is entitled to damages beyond
the market value of the dog. A pet is
not an inanimate thing that just receives affection; it also returns it (14).
Animals, or at least those animals
that we call pets, are to be viewed in
legal contexts as more than property,
not just because of their special value to
their owners but more importantly because, intrinsically, they are considered
as being more valuable than mere property. Other kinds of personal property
may be important and valuable to their
owners, but animals respond- they are
alive.

An heirloom while it might be the
source of good feelings is merely an
inanimate object and is not capable
of returning love and affection; it
has no brain capable of displaying
emotion which in turn causes a human response. Losing the right to
memoralize a pet rock, or a pet tree
or losing a family picture album is
not actionable. But a dog; that is
something else ... (15).

Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are awarded to a
party who has established that his loss
was caused by a willful or malicious act
or an act of reckless indifference to the
rights of others (16). Such damages are
normally recoverable for the willful or
wanton killing of an animal (17). and it is
/NT
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not essential to gammg a recovery for
punitive damages that the owner of the
animal establish any special value for it.
It is the nature of the act that provides
the grounds for awarding the measure of
rei ief, although the compensatory or
punitive nature of the relief may differ
among jurisdictions (18).
Recently, larger awards for punitive
damages reflect an increased awareness
of the value of animals. In one case the
court affirmed a jury verdict for punitive
damages against a policeman who maliciously killed the plaintiff's cat (19). In another decision (La Porte vs. Assoc. Independents, Inc.), the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed a punitive award of $1,000
for the malicious killing of a pet dog by
a garbage collector (20).

Mental and Emotional Distress
In the La Porte decision referred to
above, the court was called upon to decide whether damages for mental and
emotional distress should be permitted
in a suit for the killing of an animal. The
plaintiff saw a garbage collector kill her
dog by hurling an empty garbage can at
him, and a physician testified that a preexisting nervous condition of the plaintiff was exacerbated by the incident. After noting, with deference to tradition,
that it was improper to allow recovery
for the sentimental value of the dog, the
court concluded:

The restriction of the loss of a pet
to its intrinsic value in circumstances such as the one before us is
a principle we cannot accept. Without indulging in a discussion of the
affinity between "sentimental value" and "mental suffering," we feel
that the affection of a master for his
dog is a very real thing and that the
malicious destruction of the pet provides an element of damage for which
the owner should recover, irrespective of the value of the animal be297
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cause of its special training such as
a Seeing Eye dog or sheep dog (21).
Similarly in Texas, a court recently
upheld an award of $200 for mental pain
and suffering when an owner's dog was
wrongfully shot by a policeman on the
property of the owner (22). The dog had
been raised by the owner since he had
been purchased at the age of 11 days.
These two cases represent a significant departure from the traditional forms
of recovery for "property" loss. An individual is not permitted damages for
mental and emotional distress for the
destruction of her car or her furniture.
Property, by its very nature, is assumed
not to evoke this kind of emotional response. It does not have life and therefore
cannot respond, and cannot provide friendship or companionship. The focus of the
harm in all of these cases is admittedly
some human who has suffered a loss, but
it is the changing way in which we view
animals that has altered the definition of
that loss. So the courts are being forced
to address the legal status of animals as
a prerequisite to granting relief to human claimants.

ready permits suits to be brought on behalf of ships and corporations (25). The
interests of fetuses are considered in
granting the right to abortion (26), and
the right of parents to sue for prenatal
injuries (27). Are fetuses or corporations
more deserving of legal recognition and
protection than animals? On what grounds?
That the fetus may suffer? That the corporation may be deprived of some economic interest without due process? Do we
explain the differences in protection by
noting the human ownership of corporations and the fetus's potential for human
life?
To do so would be to beg the question of the bases on which we assign the
ownership of such rights. Why do we
limit legal interests to humans or human
creations? Henry Salt, Peter Singer, and
others have argued persuasively that the
biological, behavioral, and cognitive differences between the human and other
animal species are hollow justifications
for the continued failure to recognize
the interests of animals.

Conclusion

Guardianship

Although the cases discussed above
mark a significant departure from the
traditional common law approach toward
animals, the focus of harm and protectible interest remains with the human who
is asserting ownership of the animal. It is
the owner who is considered to have suffered some loss through the invasion of
a legally cognizable interest, and it is the
owner who receives compensation for his
or her loss. In order to fully I iberate
animals from their status as personal
property, courts must begin to look for
interests which are inherent to the animals themselves that have been invaded,
and then fashion some legal protection
The pileated woodpecker as well as
for those interests.
the coyote and bear, the lemmings
However, I am confident that courts
as well as the trout in the streams (24).
will continue to expand the domain of
A similar "guardianship" model al- animal rights through the "owners' rights

But what about the question of
harm to animals themselves? Can an animal gain recovery for injury sustained
through a wrongful act? What about the
practical problems involved in bringing
a suit and distributing recovery? Not
members of our species, animals would
need a representative through which their
claims could be presented. Such an approach was suggested by Justice Douglas
of the United States Supreme Court when
he urged that standing be granted to
governmental or public interest groups
to litigate on behalf of
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bootstrap" approach. As the owners of
animals assert more aggressively their
rights to the friendship, companionship,
and assistance of animals, courts and
legislatures will become more sensitive
to the importance and value of animals.
And, while this article has focused principally on companion animals, with a
few exceptions it can be argued that
changes in the rights of companion animals will effect corresponding changes
for all animals.
When this process has reached the
point at which the interdependence of
human and animal becomes clear, the
law will begin to focus on the specific interests of animals themselves, considered separately from their value as subordinates. An animal will then be seen as
an autonomous being, with interests that
are worthy of consideration equal to
those of human beings; these will not be
the same interests, but rather, different
ones that are similarly deserving.
This change will take place as a
consequence of efforts to enlarge the
sphere of human interests assigned to
the owners of animals and to thereby increase the pecuniary rewards for the
successful assertion of these interests. In
order to address this issue, the law will
have to focus on precisely what the human has lost. A thorough investigation
and evaluation of this loss will result in
better understanding of the sentient, cognitive, and biological relationships between human and animal (28). Inevitably, some owner or animal group will
eventually introduce a breakthrough case,
on behalf of an animal, in which a court
will award damages for the loss to the
animal himself. These damages will be
awarded as compensation for losses relative to interests that will have become
legally recognized as established interests of animals, according to the precedents set by the "bootstrap" analysis
(29). Some of these interests are already
in the process of being defined; for exINT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 3(4] 1982
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ample, the rights to life and humane treatment, which were established in the cases
described above. Other interests will
probably be defined soon- these include
adequate food and shelter and some standard for freedom of movement.
Ironically, this process in the legal
sphere will find its culmination when human and animal recognize what has always been true: that they are mutually
dependent on each other for survival,
meaning, and happiness, on an unknown,
and mysterious planet.
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dependent on each other for survival,
meaning, and happiness, on an unknown,
and mysterious planet.
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The Economics
of Farm Animal Welfare
A.J.F. Webster
The number of ways that one can
be nice or nasty to animals are legion.
This article will consider only one very
specific aspect of farm animal welfare,
namely, those systems of intensive animal production in which the system itself, irrespective of the quality of the
stockmanship within the system, appears
to restrict the normal behavior of farm
animals to an unacceptable degree. The
systems that were considered by the
House of Commons Select Committee
on Agriculure (1981) include egg production from hens in battery cages, production of veal from calves deprived of
solid food and isolated in wooden crates,
and the most intensive aspects of pig
production, namely, cages for weaners
and stalls, with or without tethers, for
dry sows.
In their most extreme form, the battery cage, the veal calf crate, and the
dry sow stall represent the absolute limits to intensification, since the floor
space allocated to each animal is, in effect, no greater than- and sometimes less
than- the floor space occupied by the
animal when it adopts a normal resting
position. Table 1 illustrates examples of
floor space allocations for hens, pigs,
and calves in commercial intensive units
and compares some of these with the recommendations in the revised drafts of
the Welfare Codes.
The Farm Animal Welfare Council
has been criticized for recommending
space allowances in excess of those currently being used in commerce, without
providing substantial scientific evidence
to show that the welfare of laying hens

would be significantly improved by increasing floor space per bird from, say,
400 to 650 sq em. The advocates of intensive systems contrast this lack of scientific evidence in favor of increased
space allowances with the benefits that
have accrued from intensification, not
only in terms of animal production, but
also in terms of animal health. For example, it is much easier to control respiratory
disease and parasitism in laying birds
kept in cages than in those housed on
deep I itter.
It is, however, impossible to argue
that the policy of space restriction summarized in Table 1 arose out of any positive concern for animal welfare. In order
to generate as much gross income as possible and, more important, to stay competitive, producers have simply jammed
animals in as tightly as possible. If these
intensive producers are moved by compassion for their animals, it has not affected their actions in this regard. In the
U.K. at least, there are no limits imposed
on a farmer's right to crowd his animals
to the absolute limit, and while this situation persists the intensive farmer has
little option but to do just that, if he
wishes to retain his competitive position
in the market.

Space Restriction and Stress
As indicated above, there is I ittle
clear evidence to show that extreme space
restriction affects the performance of
farm animals or induces disturbed behavior. This is not altogether surprising,
since it is difficult to construct ethological
experiments designed to reveal disturbed

Dr. Webster is with the Department of Animal Husbandry, the University of Bristol, Bristol, England. This
article was an invited paper presented at the Institute of Biology symposium, "Animal Welfare in Agriculture," London, November 1981.
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